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Abstract. After a decade of steady growth in the acceptance of the existence of climate
change and its anthropogenic causes, opinions have polarized, with almost one-third of
Americans, mostly Republicans, denying that the climate is changing or that human activity is
responsible. What causes Americans to change their minds on this issue? Using a large panel
data set, we examined the impacts of direct experience with weather anomalies, ideology,
relative prioritization of environmental conservation in comparison to economic development,
and motivated reasoning that adjusts individual opinion to align with others who share one’s
party identification. A generalized ordered logit model confirmed the importance of political
ideology, party identification, and relative concern about environmental conservation and
economic development on attitude change. The effect of party identification strengthened with
attentiveness to news and public affairs, consistent with the logic of motivated reasoning. Recent
experience with hot summers, warm winters, droughts, and natural disasters had only a minimal
impact on attitude change.
Key Words: climate change, longitudinal survey, opinion change, motivated reasoning, political
ideology
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The United States lags behind much of the world in support for action to mitigate climate
change (Ipsos MORI, 2014). Almost one-third of Americans, primarily Republicans, believe
either that climate change is not occurring or that it is not due to human activity (Riffkin, 2014;
Leiserowitz et al, 2016; Mills et al, 2016). The Pew Research Center found that 79 percent of
liberal Democrats, but only 15 percent of conservative Republicans believed that as a result of
human activity, the earth is warming (Funk and Kennedy, 2016, 9).
Belief about the existence and causes of global climate change are also related to values
concerning the relative importance of job growth as opposed to environmental conservation. As
Heath and Gifford noted (2006, 65-66), “those who value the free market system over
environmental quality tend to believe that global change is not occurring, that the causes of
global climate change are more natural than human caused, and that its consequences will not be
negative.”
The process by which individuals develop and change their views about climate change is
complex. In this paper, we demonstrate that a national sample of Americans changed their
opinions between 2010 and 2014 primarily to align better with those who share their party
identification and political ideology. This conforms with the theory of motivated reasoning: that
evidence consistent with prior beliefs is viewed as strong, and that on politically salient issues,
people strive to bring their opinions into conformance with those who share their political
identity (Kahan et al., 2012).
Previous studies, aggregating cross-sectional surveys across time have identified trends
and polarization in overall public opinion, but have not been able to track how individuals
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modify their attitudes over time. The contribution of this paper is its analysis of a nationally
representative panel of 9500 respondents who were asked the same question about climate
change in 2010 and 2014. These data provide the basis for the first large-sample empirical
analysis of individual opinion change on global warming. Using these data, we identified people
who maintained the same opinion as opposed to those who changed their opinions, becoming
either more concerned or more skeptical about climate change. We then examined the relative
importance of political ideology, party identification, relative concern about the environment in
comparison with the economy, and recent experience with anomalous weather patterns on
stability or shifts in opinion. The empirical analysis supports the theory of motivated reasoning:
Americans tend to align their opinions on climate change to match those of others who share
their political party or political ideology.

Findings About Beliefs in Climate Change from Cross-Sectional Studies
Belief in the existence of climate change and its anthropogenic causes has not grown
consistently in the United States. Based on a review of 240 articles published between 1980 and
2014, Capstick et al. (2015) showed that acceptance of the existence of climate change grew
steadily from the 1980s through the early 1990s, but was more erratic in the next decade. More
recently, skepticism has grown and opinions have polarized along political party lines. Studies
from the Yale Project on Climate Change reported that although a slowly growing majority of
Americans are worried about global warming, only a minority believe human action is causing it
(Howe and Leiserowitz, 2013, Roser-Renouf et al., 2014). Furthermore, those who believe that
the climate change is not changing have become more certain in their beliefs (Leiserowitz et al.
2015).
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A vast literature has examined trends in beliefs about the existence of and causes for
climate change, and the correlates of these beliefs. The findings of this research form the basis
of the hypotheses about the influence of four sets of variables on receptivity to messages about
climate change: (1) opinion leaders or membership in a social network; (2) direct experience
with weather events that could be linked to global climate change, (3) science education as well
as general scientific literacy; and (4) demographic characteristics that pre-condition receptivity to
messages about climate change.

Influence of Opinion Leaders or Membership in a Social Network
Early research suggested that a small number of “opinion leaders” shaped the influence of
media on public opinion (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1968).
Zaller (1992) added the modification that those who are either less attentive to or less aware of
the messages being promulgated by the elite are less likely to accept them. Social networks and
interactions can also influence the ways in which people form and change opinions (Watts and
Dodds, 2007; Moussaid et al, 2013). People use several perspectives or “frames” to interpret
information generally, especially information that has a highly political or emotional edge, and
these frames matter more in opinion formation than the facts themselves (Chong and Druckman,
2007; Hoffman, 2015).
Both the framing of messages about climate change and the current association of the
entire subject of climate change with political ideology have an overwhelming impact on
acceptance of ideas about climate change (Bolsen, Druckman and Cook, 2014a, Brulle,
Carmichael, and Jenkins, 2012, Druckman and Bolsen, 2011). Kahan (2015a, 12) found that
simply providing more accurate scientific information to the general public does not change
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opinions, but instead reinforces prior views: “those whose cultural commitments predispose them
to be concerned about climate change become even more so as their level of science
comprehension increases.” People selectively seek evidence that supports the position of the
group with which they identify and dismiss evidence that contradicts it (van der Linden, 2015).
The phenomenon of seeking information that confirms prior beliefs is known as
“motivated reasoning” or “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998; Kahan 2015b). One exhibits
motivated reasoning when one “view[s] evidence consistent with prior opinions as stronger or
more effective” (Druckman 2015, 60). When political party shapes motivated reasoning, this
phenomenon is labelled “partisan motivated reasoning” (Bolsen et al., 2014, Bolsen et al., 2015)
or “politically motivated reasoning” (Kahan, 2015). In this framing, individuals strive to shape
their opinions on politically salient issues to conform with those of their party, reject information
and ideas that conflict with party ideology, and become ever more convinced that their party’s
position is accurate (Kahan et al., 2012).
Political parties in the United States are sharply divided on climate change and its
anthropogenic causes. While the Democratic party views climate change as an urgent problem,
the Republican party tends to deny or downplay its significance. While the 2016 Democratic
party platform characterizes climate change as “a real and urgent threat” and states that
“Democrats share a deep commitment to tackling the climate challenge” (Democratic Party
Platform Committee, 2016, 27), the Republican party platform notes that “climate change is far
from this nation’s most pressing national security issue” and opposes “any carbon tax”
(Republican National Committee, 2016, 20). Further, many notable Republican leaders are not
convinced that the planet is warming or that human activity is the primary driver of climate
change (Gregoire, 2015; McCright, Dunlap and Xiao, 2014). This difference between
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conservative and liberal party positions seems to be unique to the United States (Båtstrand,
2015).

Direct Experience with Environmental Hazards or Temperature Variability
Some studies have found that personal experience with storms, floods, drought or
temperature anomalies leads to greater acceptance of the existence of climate change. For
example, respondents in the U.K. who had experienced flood damage expressed more concern
about climate change (Spence et al., 2011). Similarly, Elrick-Barr et al (2015) studied two
coastal communities in Australia that were equally vulnerable to climate hazards and found that
it was not proximity to the coast, but instead prior experience with the hazard, that increased
perceived risk. Brody et al (2008) also found only a weak relationship between proximity to
flood-prone areas and risk perception, particularly in comparison with the impact of the
personality variables they used as controls, including “perceived efficacy” and “new ecological
values” (Brody et al, 2008, 88).
Several studies have focused on warmer summer or winter temperatures in affecting
perceptions of climate change. Hamilton and Keim (2009) found that in U.S. regions
accustomed to winter snow, relatively warm winters were associated with increased concern with
climate change. Zaval et al. (2014) and Li, Johnson and Zaval (2011) found that respondents
expressed greater concern about global warming on hot summer days, and speculated that people
may substitute the current temperature for general trends when thinking about global warming.
Similarly, Borick and Rabe (2010, 6) found that respondents identified “warmer temperatures in
your area during recent years” as a major influence on their views that “the earth is getting
warmer.” In contrast, Egan and Mullin (2012) found that any effect of the daily temperature
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immediately before or at the time of the survey on opinion about global warming was likely to be
temporary.
Three studies found that warmer-than-normal summers and winters had an effect, but
only in combination with prior beliefs about climate (Howe and Leiserowitz, 2013, Hamilton and
Stampone, 2013, Clayton et al., 2015). In contrast, Deryugina (2013) matched a sample of US
adults from the Gallup Environmental Poll for 2003-2010 with local weather information, and
found that short-run temperature fluctuations lasting between 1-14 days had no effect on beliefs
about global warming. Even extreme events such as “Snowmaggedon” and Superstorm Sandy
did not seem to alter climate change perception (Trenberth et al., 2015, Lehner and Stocker,
2015, Saad, 2015). In trying to account for this absence of effect, Mastandrea et al. (2006)
hypothesized that Americans do not consider climate change to be as important and immediate as
other environmental issues. Leiserowitz and Broad (2006, 55) noted that the image that many
Americans have of the impacts of global warming, such as melting polar icecaps, are distant
from everyday experience: “most Americans lacked vivid, concrete, and personal-relevant
affective images of climate change, which helps explain why climate change remains a relatively
low priority national or environmental issue.” In addition, many Americans believe that even if
climate change does cause disruption, society will either adapt or find a technological solution.
Because of their mid-latitude location, Americans may also find it difficult to experience
“climate change” directly, and for those who live in areas where summers and winters have
sharply different temperature ranges, the experience of cold in the winter may erase the memory
of the previous hot summer (Weber, 2010, Van Der Linden, 2014, Howe and Leiserowitz, 2013).
Indeed, a recent survey found that some view climate change as a positive trend, particularly for
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those Americans who have experienced relatively mild winters between 1974 and 2013 (Egan
and Mullin 2016).
Another issue that impedes a direct relationship between experienced weather and belief
in climate change is the process that people must undertake to see the linkage. The probability
that people connect weather patterns to global climate change is likely to be filtered by prior
beliefs or ideology that affects the ways in which they process information. In addition, when
people are exposed to weather anomalies but do not suffer serious consequences, they may
become more confident that climate change is not occurring or that it is not serious (Saad, 2015,
Brody et al., 2008)

Science education and scientific literacy
Some have hypothesized that directed science education about human-caused climate
change can shift opinion overcoming ideological resistance. Guy et al. (2014) found such a
pattern in Australia, and a 2008 survey in the United States (Borick and Rabe 2010) concluded
that the 2007 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and Al Gore’s
documentary An Inconvenient Truth had a major impact on Americans’ attitudes on global
warming. Presumably in response to both sources of information, American respondents cited
images of shrinking glaciers and polar ice as the most important issues affecting their belief in
global warming. In contrast, however, the preponderance of survey research in the United States
has shown that scientific articles or assessment reports do not move public opinion (Brulle et al.,
2012, Hamilton, 2011, Hart and Nisbet, 2011, Zia and Todd, 2010). No matter how vivid the
message or how strong the technical background of the audience, other factors are more
important in shaping attitudes about climate change.
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Demographic characteristics and receptivity to information about climate change
Some research suggests that both gender and ethnicity may independently affect ideology
or world-view, in turn shaping the receptivity to new information on climate change. Surveys
have found that women are more concerned than men about climate change, perhaps due to
differences in socialization and therefore the development of key values (McCright and Dunlap,
2011). White males tend to be relatively more hierarchical and individualistic, and, as a result,
show greater skepticism about any kind of risk, including the deleterious effects of global
climate change (Kahan et al., 2007, Finucane et al., 2000).

Hypotheses
In sum, cross-sectional surveys have provided overwhelming evidence that ideology,
party identification, and attitudes about environmental conservation vs. economic development
strongly influence beliefs about climate change in the U.S. Based on the theory of politically
motivated reasoning, we hypothesized that people tend to shift their opinions over time to better
match those of opinion leaders they respect, and that this effect is even stronger for those who
pay more attention to messages from party elites. We also explored the effects of education
levels and personal experience with hot summers, warm winters, droughts, and weather-related
natural disasters on changing beliefs about climate change.

Data and Methods
The nine cross-sectional surveys that make up the Cooperative Congressional Election
Study (CCES) have provided the basis for many scholarly studies. The CCES also includes a
nationally representative 2010–14 panel, which repeatedly asked 9500 respondents the same
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question about climate change. YouGov/Polimetrix administers the “opt-in” internet-based
survey, that compensates respondents with rewards or points for every survey they complete
(Ansolabehere and Schaffner, 2014). Schaffner and Ansolabehere (2015a; 2015b) described the
detailed sampling strategy, sample matching algorithm, and theoretical background for the panel
study. They noted that YouGov re-interviewed 83 percent of the 2010 panel sample in 2012 and
68 percent of the 2012 respondents in 2014. Although any attrition decreases the
representativeness of panel surveys, the overall retention rate of 56 percent compares favorably
to the 41 percent retention rates reported in the 2000–2004 American National Election Studies.
Sample composition did not change markedly between 2010 and 2014; although attrition was
somewhat higher for blacks and non-voters, attrition rates were generally similar among
subgroups (Schaffner and Ansolabehere, 2015a; 2015b).
The dependent variable in this analysis was derived by comparing the 2010 and 2014
responses to the following question: “From what you know about global climate change or
global warming, which one of the following statements comes closest to your opinion?
1. Global climate change has been established as a serious problem and immediate
action is necessary,
2. There is enough evidence that climate change is taking place and some action
should be taken,
3. We don’t know enough about global climate change and more research is
necessary before we take any actions,
4. Concern about global climate change is exaggerated and no action is necessary, or
5. Global climate change is not occurring and this is not a real issue.”
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We coded the 65 percent who gave the same response in both years as 0, the 17 percent who
gave a lower-numbered answer in 2014 as -1, and the 18 percent who gave a higher-numbered
answer in 2014 as +1.
We measured all individual-level independent variables in 2010 and experiences with
weather anomalies within the period between the two surveys. We used two dummy variables to
distinguish Democrats and Republicans from independents, the reference group. To test whether
partisan respondents sought partisan information, we tested the interaction between party
identification and interest in public affairs as measured on a four-level scale, based on responses
to the question: “Some people seem to follow what’s going on in government and public affairs
most of the time, whether there’s an election going on or not. Others aren’t that interested.
Would you say you follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most of the time,
some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?”
We coded liberalism as a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 (very conservative) to 5 (very
liberal). We measured attitudes about the relative importance of environmental conservation
versus economic development based on 2010 responses to the question, “Some people think it is
important to protect the environment even if it costs some jobs or otherwise reduces our standard
of living. Other people think that protecting the environment is not as important as maintaining
jobs and our standard of living. Which is closer to the way you feel, or haven't you thought much
about this?” We coded this variable as 1 for those who said it was much more important to
protect jobs and 5 for those who said it was much more important to protect the environment. To
test the “white male” effect, we introduced nine dummy variables for white women, and black,
Hispanic, Asian, and “other” men and women.
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Because the CCES identifies the respondent’s county of residence, we were able to
associate weather-related variables at the county level, using other data sets. To measure warm
winters and hot summers, we used the mean January and July temperatures in the county from
2011 to 2014, minus the mean temperatures for the same month from 1950 to 2010 (Menne et al,
2010). Since most of the previous research has weather-related variables for much shorter
periods ranging from that day’s temperature (Egan and Mullin, 2012) to up to one year
(Hamilton and Stampone, 2013), we also ran models using only data from the previous year.
The effects were similar to those reported. The temperature data came from the Global
Historical Climatology Network-Daily at National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
Across the entire sample, the average January temperature from 2011 through 2014 was slightly
cooler (0.1 ˚C) than in 1950-2010, but the average July temperature was 0.5˚C higher than the
baseline.
We measured experience with drought using the number of weeks between November
2010 and September 2014 that the county had moderate-to-extreme drought conditions (D1 to
D4), using data from the United States Drought Monitor. Four measures of the severity of eight
natural disasters in the county between November 2010 and September 2014 were analyzed: the
natural logarithms of total fatalities, injuries, crop damage, and property damage due to coastal
flooding, drought, flooding, heat, hurricane/tropical storm, severe storm/thunder storm, tornado,
or winter weather (Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute, 2014).
For the initial analysis, we compared the characteristics of people who did and did not
change their opinions on climate change between 2010 and 2014. We tabulated the differences
between changers and non-changers with respect to party identification, ideology, relative
importance of environmental conservation, interest in public affairs, race/ethnicity, gender, age,
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and education. Given the overwhelming impact of political party identification on beliefs about
climate change, we then focused on opinion change among respondents who identified with the
same political party in 2010 and 2014.
We ran generalized ordered logit models to assess the impact of our independent variables on
whether respondents became more skeptical, did not change, or became more concerned about
climate change between 2010 and 2014.1 Because the weather-related variables are measured at
the county level, we clustered the standard errors at the same level.2 We could not use simple
ordered logit analysis because our model violated the proportionality of odds assumption. To
ease interpretation, we did not report the coefficients from the Stata gologit2 command
(Williams, 2005). Instead, we reported the marginal effects, also called the average partial
effects or APE (Wooldridge, 2009).

Opinion Change from 2010 to 2014
Overall, the distribution of opinion on climate change was similar in 2010 and 2014.
Changes tended to come at the two extreme ends of the spectrum: increases in those stating that
climate change is not occurring or that climate change is a serious issue warranting action,
balanced by small decreases in those stating that more research is needed (Table 1).

1

Ordered logistic regression assumes that the independent variables have linear (constant)
impacts on the natural logarithms of the odds, rather than on the probabilities, of each belief.
Thus, the impact of each independent variable on the probabilities varies across individuals. The
APE estimates the probability change for each individual in the data set, then calculates the mean
of those changes.
2 We also tested a multilevel mixed-effects ordered logistic regression using the Stata meologit
command. The meologit command has a strength in recognizing that we are measuring the
weather-related variables at the county level and the other variables at the individual level, but a
weakness in not allowing us to relax the parallel odds assumption. Nonetheless, meologit did not
meaningfully change the findings.
13

Table 1 — Percentages Taking Each Position on Climate Change, 2010 and 2014

Global climate change is not occurring
Concern is exaggerated; No action is needed
More research is needed
Enough evidence that climate change is taking place
Global climate change is a serious issue; Action need
Total
Note: Sampling weight applied.

2010

2014

6.2
19.5
20.0
27.0
27.3

7.6
19.5
18.4
24.8
29.7

100

100

However, more than 35 percent of the respondents gave different responses in 2014 than
they had in 2010. Although one would expect some level of variability in survey responses with
a repeated survey over a four-year period of time, this volume of change exceeded the variability
noted on other survey items such as opinions on the Affordability Care Act, granting legal status
to immigrants or gun control (Schaffner and Ansolabehere, 2015a, 21).
The five responses were condensed into three categories (Table 2). The first category
summarized those who are not concerned with global climate change: the combination of
“Global climate change is not occurring and this is not a real issue” and “Concern about global
climate change is exaggerated and no action is necessary.” The second category “We don’t
know enough about global climate change and more research is necessary before we take any
actions” remained the middle position. The third category was the combination of those
concerned with global climate change: “Global climate change has been established as a serious
problem and immediate action is necessary” and “There is enough evidence that climate change
is taking place and some action should be taken.” Cross-tabulations and chi squared tests
compared the six groups off the diagonal to those in the same rows whose views remained the
same between 2010 and 2014 (Table 3).
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Table 2 – Percentages Changing Opinions between 2010 and 2014
Climate Change (2014)
Climate change is not
happening or is
exaggerated

More
study is
needed

Climate change is
occurring and demands
action

Climate change is not
happening or is
exaggerated

77.4

19.1

3.5

More study is needed

25.2

56.1

18.8

2.1

6.5

92.4

Climate Change (2010)

Climate change is
occurring and demands
action
Note: Sampling weight applied.
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Table 3 — Characteristics of Those Whose Opinions Changed
2014: climate change is not
2014: more study is
happening or is
needed
exaggerated
2010: climate change
N = 363
is not happening or is
Moderate or liberal
exaggerated
ideology
Economy and
environment are of
equal importance
Moderate interest in
public affairs
Independent or
Democrat
2010: more study is N = 532
needed
Conservative to very
conservative
Economy is more
important than the
environment
Interested in public affairs
most of the time
Republican

2014: climate change is
occurring and demands
action
N = 109
Below age 50
Fewer post-graduate, more
with “some college”
Female
Moderate, liberal ideology
Economy and environment
are of equal importance
Democrat
NOT white male
N = 335
Below age 65
Female
Moderate to liberal
Environment is somewhat
more important than the
economy
Some interest in public
affairs
Democrat
Nonwhite

2010: climate changeN = 101
N = 281
is occurring and
More in age 40-50 group, NOT in California
demands action
fewer over 50
Less well educated
Conservative to very
Female
conservative
Conservative to very
Less frequent for college conservative
educated
Economic and
Economy is more
Environment are
important than
equally important or
environment
economy is more
Some interest in
important
public affairs
Infrequent interest in
Republican
public affairs
Independent or
Republican
NOT white male
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Among those who said that climate change was not occurring in 2010, those who
changed to saying that more research is needed in 2014 were more likely to be Democrats or
independents, were moderate or liberal in ideology, placed equal importance on the economy and
the environment, and showed moderate interest in public affairs. The very small percentage who
shifted from a belief that climate change is not occurring to the belief that it is occurring were
more likely to be female, Democrats, under age 50, moderate or liberal, not white males, had a
moderate interest in public affairs, gave equal weight to the economy and environment, and had
started but not completed college.
Among those who said that more study was needed in 2010, respondents who shifted to
believing that climate change is not happening or is exaggerated were more likely to be
conservative or very conservative, to value the economy and jobs over the environment, to be
interested in public affairs most of the time, and to be Republican. Those whose opinions shifted
in the opposite direction, stating in 2014 that climate change is occurring, were more likely to be
under 65, female, nonwhite, moderate to liberal, Democrat, and to view the environment as
somewhat more important than the economy.
Finally, respondents who said that climate change is occurring in 2010 but said that
climate change is not happening or is exaggerated in 2014 were more likely to be age 40-to-50,
conservative to very conservative, Republican, to believe the economy is more important than
the environment, and to have some interest in public affairs. The respondents who shifted to
calling for more research on whether climate change is occurring by 2014 were less well
educated, female, Republican, conservative to very conservative, felt the economy is equally or
slightly more important than the environment, and were infrequently interested in public affairs.
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Opinion Change Among Republicans, Democrats and Independents
To test the theory of motivated reasoning, we next focused on how political party
affiliation affected the strength and direction of such change. For this analysis, we restricted the
sample to the 85 percent (8,113 respondents) who had not changed their political party affiliation
between 2010 and 2014.
Overall, a much small proportion of these respondents, 18 percent compared to the 35
percent noted for the full sample, had changed their opinion over the 2010-2014 time period. We
found the impact of political party on the direction of change overwhelming (Table 4).
Democrats were even more likely to attest that climate change is occurring and that this change
demands action: the largest percentage of opinion changers were in the category of those who
had formerly said more research was needed, and now were convinced that climate change was
occurring. On the other hand, Republicans were more likely to become more skeptical about
climate change: 48.2 percent remained skeptical about climate change throughout the study
period, and an additional 11.1 percent who had previously stated that more research was needed,
reported by 2014 that climate change is not occurring or is exaggerated.
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Table 4. Attitude Change by Party Identification
Republican Independent
Climate Change not occurring 2010
Climate Change not occurring 2014
More research in 2014
Climate change occurring in 2014
Sample size
More research needed in 2010
Climate Change not occurring 2014
More research in 2014
Climate change occurring in 2014
Sample size
Climate Change occurring 2010
Climate Change not occurring 2014
More research in 2014
Climate change occurring in 2014
Sample size

84.7
12.8
2.5
2017

38.2
50.8
10.9
1025

9.5
22.8
67.7
504

73.4
17.1
9.5
158

20.0
51.0
29.0
145

2.8
10.4
86.7
316

Democrat
48.5
28.2
23.3
103

12.4
38.8
48.8
242

0.6
2.4
96.9
3403

The geographic pattern of opinion change when stratified by political party is complex
(Figure 1). Republicans who shifted from asking for more research in 2010 to being convinced
that climate change is not occurring tended to be more concentrated in the southeastern part of
the United States and in relatively more rural or suburban counties where they are likely to hold
local majorities.
A generalized ordered logit analysis permits the identification of the relative importance
of the independent variables (Table 5). Each row shows how a one-unit increase in the
independent variable changes the average probability of becoming more skeptical about, keeping
the same opinion on, or becoming more convinced of global climate change. Within each row,
the probability changes sum to zero. Thus, for example, a one-point rise in the relative
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importance one placed on the environment relative to jobs in 2010 led to a 4.5 percent drop in
one’s probability of becoming more skeptical about climate change by 2014. This is offset by a
4.3 percent increase in one’s probability of becoming more concerned, and a 0.3 percent increase
in one’s probability of not changing one’s position. Similarly, respondents who were one level
more liberal in 2010 were 4.8 percent more likely to increase their concern about climate change
and 5.1 percent less likely to become more skeptical.
Republicans who almost never followed the news about public affairs were 9.5 percent
more likely than comparable independents to become more concerned about climate change and
10.7 percent less likely to become more skeptical. Democrats who almost never followed the
news were 11.3 percent more likely than comparable independents to increase their concern and
insignificantly less likely to increase their skepticism. In other words, low-information
Democrats were only 1.8 percent more likely than low-information Republicans to increase their
concern and 8.4 percent less likely to become more skeptical.
For those interested in news and public affairs, however, the partisan effects were clear.
Following the news did not change the opinion of independents much, but each one-point rise on
the four-point news interest scale increased Republicans’ probability of becoming more skeptical
about climate change by 5.7 percent and decreased their probability of becoming more concerned
by 3.2 percent. In contrast, following the news reduced Democrats’ chances of becoming more
skeptical; each one-point rise on the four-point news interest scale reduced their probability of
greater skepticism by 3.3 percent. Thus, each one-point rise in news interest widened the gap
between Republicans and Democrats by 9 percent. This is strong evidence for the motivated
reasoning hypothesis: individuals find information to confirm the general ideology of the group
to which they belong, and shift their beliefs towards the modal belief of their reference group.
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We found little evidence that direct experience with warmer weather, droughts, and
weather-related natural disasters affected opinions about climate change. Of the weather-related
independent variables, only warm winters had a statistically significant impact: a one-degree
increase in average January temperatures relative to the baseline is associated with a 0.8 percent
increase in the probability of rising concern and a 0.9 percent decrease in the probability of
greater skepticism (Table 5). The impacts of hot summers, droughts, and natural disasters on
change in opinion were not statistically distinguishable from zero.
The impacts of other variables on opinion change were weaker and less consistent. Moreeducated and older respondents were less likely to become more skeptical about climate change.
We found little evidence for the white male effect. Only “other” females were more likely than
comparable white men to increase their concern about climate change between 2010 and 2014.
Black women and black, Hispanic, and “other” men were all about 5 percent more likely than
comparable white men to increase their skepticism.
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Table 5. Changes in Opinions, 2010-2014
Average Partial Effects from Generalized Ordered Logit Model
Change in Beliefs
Became More
Skeptical

Did Not
Change

Became More
Concerned

-4.5***
(0.4)

0.3*
(0.1)

4.3***
(0.3)

-5.1***
(0.4)

0.3*
(0.1)

4.8***
(0.4)

-10.7†
(5.5)

1.1
(2.0)

9.5*
(4.2)

-2.1
(6.1)

-9.3*
(4.3)

11.3*
(4.5)

5.7***
(1.2)

-2.5***
(0.6)

-3.2***
(0.7)

-2.3
(1.5)

0.0
(0.2)

2.3
(1.5)

Democrats

-3.3***
(0.6)

1.5
(1.2)

1.8
(1.2)

Education (1-5)

-1.1**
(0.3)

1.2**
(0.4)

-0.2
(0.3)

Age

-0.1**
(0.0)

0.1*
(0.0)

0.0
(0.0)

-0.9**
(0.3)

0.1†
(0.0)

0.8**
(0.3)

Avg. Jul Temp Dev

0.3
(0.4)

-0.0
(0.0)

-0.2
(0.4)

Weeks of drought conditions (C2)

0.0
(0.0)

-0.0
(0.0)

-0.0
(0.0)

Log total fatalities

0.4
(0.3)

-0.0
(0.0)

-0.4
(0.3)

Log total injuries

-0.0

0.0

0.0

Relative importance of environment and
economy (1-5)
Liberalism (1-5)
Republicans
Almost never follows public affairs information
Democrats
Almost never follows public affairs information
Interest in news and public affairs (1-4)
Republicans
Independents

Weather-related variables
Avg. Jan Temp Dev
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(0.2)

(0.0)

(0.2)

Log total crop damages

0.0
(0.1)

-0.0
(0.0)

-0.0
(0.0)

Log total property damages

-0.1
(0.1)

0.0
(0.0)

0.1
(0.1)

-0.8
(0.7)

0.0
(0.0)

0.7
(0.6)

Black female

5.1**
(1.7)

-0.3†
(0.2)

-4.8**
(1.6)

Hispanic female

2.3
(2.2)

-0.1
(0.1)

-2.2
(2.1)

Other female

3.8
(3.6)

-11.3**
(3.8)

7.5*
(3.1)

Black male

6.4*
(2.6)

-7.0*
(3.0)

0.6
(2.4)

Hispanic male

5.0*
(2.0)

-8.3**
(2.6)

3.3
(2.3)

Other male

4.9*
(2.0)

-0.3†
(0.2)

-4.6*
(1.9)

Observations

1,347

5,085

1,442

White male effect?
White female

Standard errors, clustering at the county level, are in parentheses
†
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Respondent’s belief of climate change in 2010 is included in the model

Conclusions
Americans are becoming more polarized along partisan lines, and that change tends to
bring the individual in line with the modal view of the political or ideological group with which
the person identifies. An overwhelming number of Democrats strongly believe that climate
change is occurring and that immediate action is required. Independents are also somewhat
moving towards this point of view, although in smaller percentages. Republicans, on the other

23

hand, generally remained convinced that climate change is not occurring or that its seriousness is
exaggerated, and even those who sought more research on the topic in 2010 tended to become
more skeptical of the existence of climate change by 2014. This vast difference in perspective is
also reflected in the 2016 political party platforms on climate change. Democrats view climate
change as “an urgent threat” and a “defining challenge,” while the Republican platform pledges
to defeat the Clean Power Plan to cut energy sector greenhouse emissions and rejects the 2015
Paris UN agreement on climate change.
Using repeated surveys on the same individuals over a four-year period, this analysis
suggests that the direction of change in opinion is clearly related to respondents’ political and
environmental ideology, particularly when they pay more attention to public affairs: those most
engaged and interested in public affairs seem to be seeking information that confirms the
positions that their political ideology would suggest, resulting in confirmation and strengthening
of their opinions over time. This is strong evidence for the theory of motivated reasoning in
accounting for the changing opinion of Americans with respect to climate change.
In contrast, direct experience with indicators of climate change had little impact on
changes in beliefs and attitudes. Experience with hotter summers, drought, and natural disasters
did not have clear impacts on attitude change.
The absence of growth in acceptance of climate change since 1990, the increase in
partisan polarization of opinion, and the finding that direct experience with drought or warmer
summer temperatures has had little or no impact on belief in the existence of climate change
suggest that the attitudes of Americans are not very susceptible to influences outside of political
and economic ideology. Our findings portend that even with news of more summer heat, massive
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fires, drought and record-breaking storms, an important portion of the population will not accept
evidence of global climate change.
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